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I. INTRODUCTION
In November, 1987, Tommie Lee Andrews became the first person in
the United States to be convicted at a trial in which DNA evidence was
presented.' Since that time debate has ensued in courtrooms and profes-
sional journals as to whether DNA typing is ready for widespread adoption
in criminal trials.2 While courts and scholars debate the issue, several
legislatures have attempted to have the final word by enacting legislation
making DNA evidence admissible.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Stephan
Landsman, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
I Edward G. Burley, Note, A Study in Scarlet: Criminal DNA Typing Reaches
the Courts and Legislatures, VI JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLITICS 755, 788 (1990).
DNA typing had been used previously in the United Kingdom. Id. at 785-87.
2 DNA typing is also used in paternity cases although its use in establishing
paternity is far less disputed. Paternity testing involves fresh samples of blood
with the opportunity to retest unlike the circumstances of most criminal cases.
The analysis of the DNA prints is subject to less error since the comparison is
between a limited number of persons as opposed to an unknown number of po-
tential matches as in a criminal case. Peter J. Neufeld and Barry C. Scheck, No:
Less Than Meets the Eye, A.B.A. J., 35 (Sept. 1990).
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This note examines the conflict over acceptance of DNA evidence. Part
I discusses the process of DNA typing as a form of scientific evidence and
the courts' responses to this novel technique. Part II examines the leg-
islative responses to DNA typing. Part III explores the potential impact
of the admissibility statutes both on the courts and on the accused. Fi-
nally, Part IV suggests areas of legislative regulation which may aid in
resolving the current difficulties of DNA typing.
II. DNA EVIDENCE AND THE COURTS
A. DNA: Novel Scientific Evidence
DNA typing, as a form of scientific evidence, allows the jury to draw
inferences of guilt or innocence based on minute amounts of physical
evidence found at a crime scene. 3 The most common process 4 of preparing
a forensic sample for admission at trial consists of seven steps:5
1. Extraction: the forensic sample, usually blood or semen, is treated
with enzymes and chemicals to extract the DNA from the cells.6 If not
enough DNA is extracted, the analysis cannot proceed. 7 The DNA must
be purified to remove common contaminants8 which may interfere with
later steps in the process. 9
3DNA testing requires smaller amounts of sample tissue than do other tests.
Peter J. Neufeld and Neville Colman, When Science Takes the Witness Stand,
Sci. Am., 50 (May, 1990); Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling:
Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV.
465, 468-69 (1990); Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe; Note, DNA Identification
Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REV 903, 918-19 nn.72-78 (1988) (description
of sample sizes necessary for DNA profiling).
4 The process used by two of the private testing laboratories, Cellmark Diag-
nostics Corporation and Lifecodes Corporation, and the FBI testing facilities is
known as restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis. The third
private company, Cetus, uses a different method, polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
which is not widely used at this time. Hoeffel, supra note 3, at 471-75.
5The descriptions that follow are presented in a most basic form. More detailed
descriptions are readily available. See Magistrate's Report, United States v. Yee,
No. 3:89CRO720, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15908 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1990). United
States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d
985 (Supp. 1989); William C. Thompson and Simon F. Ford, DNA Typing: Ac-
ceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45,
64-76 (1989); Stephen C. Petrovich, Note, DNA Typing: A Rush to Judgment, 24
GA. L. REV. 669, 673-79 (1990), Burley, supra note 1, at 766-74; Beeler & Wiebe,
supra note 3, at 909-17.
6 Thompson & Ford, supra note 5, at 65-67.
1 DNA must be of sufficient molecular weight to give accurate results. If the
sample is too old or is poorly preserved, the DNA begins to break apart into pieces
of low molecular weight. Beeler & Wiebe, supra note 3, at 919-21.
1 The DNA sample may be contaminated with bacteria, detergents or cleaning
fluids from the surrounding environment. Thompson & Ford, supra note 5, at 66.
1 Contamination may result in extra or obscured banding which would interfere
with analysis, possibly resulting in a false positive. Hoeffel, supra note 3, at 481-




2. Restriction Digestion: The purified DNA is mixed with enzymes
which cut the DNA into fragments of varying lengths.1 The action of
these enzymes can be altered by contaminants if not cleaned properly
during the extraction phase.
12
3. Gel electrophoresis: 2 The fragmented DNA is placed in a gel across
which electric current is passed. The fragments will move across the gel
at different speeds; the smaller fragments will move faster than the larger
fragments. At the end of this step, the fragments are separated according
to size through the gel block.
4. Southern Transfer: 14 The separated fragments are attached to a nylon
membrane and are treated with a chemical which causes the double
strands of DNA to separate into single strands.
5. Hybridization:'1 Genetic probes which contain radioactive markers
pair with specific DNA sequences on the single strands. 16
6. Autoradiography: 1 7 The radioactively marked probes are used to ex-
pose x-ray film resulting in the band pattern often compared to a UPC
bar code. 8 Each band represents the area of the DNA containing the
probed sequence. The bands appear at different areas along the film due
to the differing segment lengths of the DNA.
7. Interpretation of the print: " The print of the unknown sample is then
compared to other prints of known samples. The conclusion of this step
is interpreting whether the prints correspond in enough areas to be de-
clared a match.20 Ideally, the two prints would be identical, but realist-
10 Thompson & Ford, supra note 5, at 67-69.
11 The enzymes are known as restriction enzymes. They divide the DNA at
specific sites according to genetic composition. While every individual would con-
tain the same basic building blocks, the sequencing of the blocks is different in
every person (except identical twins). Thus, the site specific enzyme creates frag-
ments of different lengths. Id. at 67-68.
12 Knowledge of contaminants' effects on DNA typing is no longer limited to
lab personnel. Criminals have "used liquids to clean the bodies and destroy evi-
dence that could be used for DNA testing." Psychological Evaluation Ordered for
Suspect in Serial Killings, UPI, Jan. 25, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library
UPI file.
13 Thompson & Ford, supra note 5, at 69-70.
14 Id. at 70-71.
11 Id. at 71-74.
16 The probes are designed to attach to areas of the DNA which show great
variability across populations. Developing new probes is a thriving business. PR
NEWSWIRE, Feb. 21, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR News File.
1 Thompson & Ford, supra note 5, at 74.
1" This description is inaccurate because the bands of a DNA print are often
blurry. Rorie Sherman, Lawyers Attacking Test Reliability, NAT'L.L. J., July 3,
1989, at 4.
19 Thompson & Ford, supra note 5, at 74-76.
20 The FBI currently declares a match between two bands if they are located
within +/- 2.5% in base pairs from each other (the "match window"). Further
analysis refers to an arbitrarily defined range of base pairs called a bin. Bands
are located within the bins and the frequencies of occurrence within each bin as
compared to the database are multiplied to give the frequency of the banding
pattern in the targeted population. Magistrate's Report, United States v. Yee,
No. 3:89CRO720, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15908 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1990). United
States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990).
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ically some margin for error must be added in. The question still exists
as to how much margin of error should be allowed.2
Because this procedure is outside the experience of most laypersons,
DNA evidence requires a reliance on external validation.22 Unlike the
testimony of an eyewitness or easily identifiable physical evidence which
allow the juror to rely on common experience, 23 DNA evidence must create
the connection between the defendant and the evidence through expert
opinion.
The reliance on expert opinion is a common theme for scientific evi-
dence, but there is reason to treat DNA evidence with more care.24 While
DNA evidence is similar to other scientific evidence, it has the potential
for far greater effects. Proponents of DNA evidence have heralded it as
a radically different identification technique characterized by extremely
high degrees of accuracy 25 and by resultant statistics nearly conclusive
of guilt.26 DNA typing appears to be potent evidence 27 as jurors have
21 Neufeld & Scheck, supra note 2, at 35.
22 DNA testing "is highly technical, incapable of observation and requires the
jury to either accept or reject the scientists' conclusion that it can be done."
Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
23 Jurors, for better or worse, are more comfortable with testimony that relates
to their own perceptions; thus the emphasis that is generally placed on the often
unreliable eyewitness account. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Ad-
mitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the Perspective of Juror Psychology,
28 VILL. L. REv. 554, 565-66 (1982-83).
24 "[A] different approach is required in this complex area of DNA identification
... given the complexity of the DNA multi-system identification tests and the
powerful impact they may have on a jury . People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d
985, 987 (Supp. 1989).
21 Cellmark stated "the chance that any two people will have the same DNA
print is one in 30 billion." Neufeld & Colman, supra note 3, at 50. See United
States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990) (potential rate of false positive
is "at worst remote and at best inconceivable"); People v. Shi Fu Huang, 546
N.Y.S.2d 920 (1989) (impossible to get a false positive); Magistrate's Report,
United States v. Yee, No. 3:89CRO720, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15908, at *26 (N.D.
Ohio Oct. 26, 1990); ("[n]ever heard of an instance of a 'false positive."'); Kelly v.
State, 792 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (No possibility of false match);
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 782-83 (Va. 1989) (no false positives).
26 Statistics are represented as the chance of a random match in a designated
population but all are characterized by "one-in-a-million" odds. See Andrews v.
State, 792 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (no possibility of false match);
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 782-83 (Va. 1989) (no false positives).
26 Statistics are represented as the chance of a random match in a designated
population but all are characterized by "one-in-a-million" odds. See Andrews v.
State, 533 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (one in 839,914,540); State
v. Horsley, 792 P.2d 945 (Idaho 1990) (one in 12,678,667); People v. Shi Fu Huang,
546 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1989) (one in 20 billion); State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847,
851 (N.C. 1990) (one in 24 million); State v. Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781, 783 (S.C. 1990)
(one in 28 million North American black males); Mandujano v. State, 799 S.W.2d
318, 320 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (one in 2.4 billion); Kelly v. State, 792 S.W.2d 579,
582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (one in 13.5 million); Glover v. State, 787 S.W.2d 544,
547 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (one in 18 billion); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d
775, 782 (Va. 1989) (one in 135 million as compared to a population of 10 million
black males in the United States).
27 Stephen Labaton, DNA Fingerprinting Showdown Expected in Ohio, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 1990, § 9, at 5 (stating that DNA evidence was relied on as the




shown substantial reliance on it 28 and defendants often plea bargain
rather than face trial by DNA.
29
DNA evidence was pioneered by predominantly private organizations.
3 0
The earliest criminal trials using DNA evidence utilized scientists from
the corporations which developed forensic genetic testing to testify as to
the reliability and accuracy of DNA typing. However, the experts em-
ployed by these businesses are not unbiased witnesses31 They have an
interest in presenting testimony that will lead to judicial acceptance. The
companies stand to reap financial gains3 2 through further testing and
sales of equipment 3 as the tests become more commonly used and ac-
Cracks Cases, Markets With DNA Tests, WASH. Bus. J., vol. 9, no. 13, § 1 at 13
(quoting Montgomery County, Maryland prosecutor Robert Dean, "We've had a
number of cases where DNA testing was absolutely everything in the case");
Jerry Hicks, Torture Verdicts Set Two Precedents, L.A. TIMES, July 4, 1991, part
B, at 1 (quoting a juror, "The DNA evidence was difficult to follow, but once we
understood it, it was very overwhelming evidence.")
28 Hoeffel, supra note 3, at 515 (quoting sources reporting a death penalty
verdict in 12 minutes, DNA being the "sealer" because "you can't really argue
with science" and DNA was "the whole case.")
Imwinkelried presents an argument for admitting scientific evidence based on
its relative reliability as compared to the commonly heard and often unreliable
eyewitness accounts. He summarizes studies which show that jurors do not tend
to over- emphasize scientific evidence. Imwinkelried, supra note 23, at 566-70.
As the impact of DNA evidence on jurors can only be deduced by relying on
anecdotal records, further research is needed. The reliance on DNA testing may
be an indication of juror misunderstanding. It has been proposed that jurors are
more likely to be awed by evidence when they do not understand it. Steven M.
Egesdal, Note, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Em-
pirical Evaluation, 74 GEO. L. J. 1769, 1783 (1986).
Jurors may profess comprehension of the evidence when interviewed after a
trial. Hicks, supra note 27. Statements of this type should not forestall further
inquiry into objectively measured knowledge, for the depth of jurors' understand-
ing can only be measured against the information and presentation offered to
them. Oversimplification by the prosecution coupled with superficial cross-ex-
amination by an ill-prepared defense counsel could lead to a stilted perception of
comprehension.
29 Aun, supra note 27; Neufeld & Colman, supra note 3, at 47; Hicks, supra
note 27.
30 See Hoeffel, supra note 3, at 465, 477; Burley, supra note 1, at 765. The FBI
began to investigate DNA typing in 1984 and increased its efforts in response to
private sector developments. The FBI laboratory began operation in December,
1988. Prepared statement of John W. Hicks, Deputy Assistant Director, Labo-
ratory Division, FBI, at 3-4 [hereinafter Hicks Statement] (presented at Annap-
olis, Maryland, March 2, 1989) (available from Maryland Department of
Legislative Reference).
31 Hoeffel, supra note 3, at 477.
32 Aun, supra note 27 (Cellmark charges $490 for each forensic test); Rorie
Sherman, DNA Tests Unravel?, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 18, 1989, at 1 (Cellmark charges
$1,000 per day for expert testimony while Lifecodes charges $325 per sample and
$750 per day for testimony); Michael Unger, Court Challenge Casts Pall Over
DNA Testing: Genetic firms are poised for growth, but lax standards hurt progress,
NEWSDAY, July 30, 1989, at 47 (Lifecodes could be a $100 million company by
1994 while Cetus projects to be a $60 million company by 1992).
31 The FBI buys DNA probes from Lifecodes and other sources. The market for
sales of lab equipment, chemicals and probes is estimated at $40 million annually.
Unger, supra note 32.
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cepted. Further, these private corporations have bypassed the extensive,
but necessary, scientific research safeguards of publication and verifica-
tion.3 4 The corporations resisted disclosure of their methods to protect
their trade secrets. 5 Later attacks on their testimony revealed incon-
sistencies between their claims and the claims of independent analysts.36
The most troubling aspect of DNA typing is the lack of uniform stand-
ards for test procedure and analysis. Dr. Eric Lander, a leading molecular
geneticist, noted that forensic labs are "virtually unregulated - with the
paradoxical result that clinical laboratories must meet a higher standard
to be allowed to diagnose strep throat than forensic labs must meet to
put a defendant on death row. '37 Each of the private labs has its own
standards 8 while the FBI, which began testing in December, 1988,39 de-
veloped yet another system of lab standards. 40 These procedures are
passed on to state labs that the organizations help to establish. 41
The primary difficulty with private lab standards lies in the lack of
external scientific validation.42 The companies have erred in the past in
favor of painting a perfect picture over deficient test protocol. 43 The in-
consistency of private lab recording compels that their procedures should
be viewed with skepticism.
The FBI has adopted standards and published them as a model for use
across the country.44 The FBI was relatively cautious in its approach to
implementing DNA testing, preferring to take time to develop standards
before rushing ahead to test.45 Nonetheless, the FBI standards have been
challenged extensively by independent experts, 46 and the FBI has resisted
independent review of its procedures by maintaining that "no outsider is
DNA forensic tests validated in court, need lab accreditation, 10 BIOTECH-
NOLOGY NEWSWATCH, May 7, 1990; State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426-28
(Minn. 1989).
11 State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 427; Roger Parloff, How Barry Scheck and
Peter Neufeld Tripped Up the DNA Experts, AM. LAWYER, Dec. 1989, at 50; Thomp-
son and Ford, supra note 5, at 59.
36 See generally Parloff, supra note 35.
17 Sherman, supra note 32.
38 Charles L. Williams, DNA Fingerprinting: A Revolutionary Technique in
Forensic Science and Its Probable Effects on Criminal Evidentiary Law, 37 DRAKE
L. REV. 1, 8 (1987-88); Clare M. Tande, Note, DNA Typing, A New Investigatory
Tool, 1989 DUKE L.J. 474,480; Anthony Pearsall, DNA Printing: The Unexamined
'Witness" in Criminal Trials, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 665, 668 (1989); Burley, supra
note 1, at 770.39Hicks Statement, supra note 30, at 3-4.
40 Magistrate's Report, United States v. Yee, No. 3:89CRO720, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15908, at 4-19 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1990).
41 Pearsall, supra note 38, at 675.42 Id. at 670-71.
43 See generally Parloff, supra note 35.
See generally Hicks Statement, supra note 30.
5 d.; Williams, supra note 38, at 16.
46Magistrate's Report, United States v. Yee, No. 3:89CR0720, 1990 U.S. Dist.




qualified to evaluate the bureau's performance.."47 For these reasons, the
FBI methodology should remain under review.
Several scientific organizations have studied DNA typing in order to
develop appropriate standards. 41 The difficulty has been the lack of a
coordinating force to integrate the efforts. A national unifying voice is
needed to avoid continued duplication of efforts. The most logical source
of this leadership is Congress, which took its first step when its Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) returned a qualified endorsement of DNA
testing on August 5, 1990.49 The OTA report notes that the tests are only
"reliable and valid when properly performed and analyzed by skilled
personnel."50
The OTA also stressed that there was no scientifically endorsed method
of presenting the results of DNA analysis due to the ongoing debate over
the population statistics used to generate the probabilities.1 Yet, DNA
typing and its statistics have been introduced in criminal trials leaving
the courts to determine whether the novel evidence should be admitted.
B. Judicial Response to DNA Evidence
When confronted by novel scientific evidence, courts usually apply one
of two tests to determine whether it should be admissible. The most widely
used test for admissibility, the Frye test,52 is based on the general ac-
ceptance of a scientific technique in the appropriate field of study.53 Gen-
eral acceptance is viewed as a way to ensure reliability and validity of
the test and to ensure the availability of a substantial pool of experts
47 Neufeld & Colman, supra note 3, at 53.
41 Burley, supra note 1, at 814-18; Hoeffel, supra note 3, at 494-95; Labaton,
supra note 27.
49 Rorie Sherman, Study Endorses DNA Evidence; Congress Enters the Fray,
NAT'L_ L. J., August 13, 1990, at 3.
-OId.
51 Id.
5- Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); PAUL C. GIANNELLI &
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, § 1-5 (1986).
13Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which
the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. at 1014.
Courts have had difficulty determining which aspects of DNA typing should
be the focus of the 'general acceptance' inquiry. See Thompson & Ford, supra note
5, at 55-60. The court's decision regarding the appropriate field of study may
affect the evidence supporting general acceptance. Id.
1991]
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able to testify.54 Underlying the Frye test is the goal of preventing jury
exposure to potentially overwhelming evidence. 55
Critics of Frye claim that it is too conservative because it causes an
excessive delay in accepting evidence. 6 Frye has also been criticized for
circumventing the judicial decision making process by empowering sci-
entists to "vote" on judicial acceptance.5 7 Despite these criticisms, DNA
evidence was admitted using the Frye test before scientific consensus was
reached.
DNA evidence was admitted under Frye because the underlying the-
ories and techniques of the test have been well accepted by the scientific
community for years. 58 Since forensic application of DNA testing rested
on private development, few qualified experts were available to testify
for the defense about the application of DNA analysis to criminal iden-
tification. 59 Defense experts tended to be scientists engaged in research
who were forced to speculate on the inherent dangers of the test when
used as a forensic tool.60 Often no defense experts at all appeared at trial.
6 1
In fact, the first trial in which the defense presented a well supported
attack based on expert testimony resulted in a consensus of scientists
that the test, as performed in that instance, was not reliable.62
- GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 52, at § 1-5(A); see generally Paul
C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States,
a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
16 "Frye doctrine: The nature of scientific evidence prevents jurors from eval-
uating it in a manner substantially similar to other evidence because jurors are
in awe of scientific testimony and tend to overestimate its probative value." Eges-
dal, supra note 28, at 1772.
56 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 52, at § 1-5(E); Giannelli, supra note
54, at 1223.
17 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 52, at § 1-5(E).
58 There is nothing controversial about the theory underlying DNA typing.
Indeed, this theory is so well accepted that its accuracy is unlikely even to
be raised as an issue in hearings on the admissibility of the new tests ...
the theory has repeatedly been put to the test and has successfully predicted
subsequent observations.
People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 989 (Supp. 1989) (citing Thompson & Ford,
supra note 5, at 60-61.)
19 Id. "The defense counsel in one case explained that he had asked dozens of
molecular biologists to testify but all had refused." Neufeld & Colman, supra note
3, at 52.
o See generally Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
61 Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (no expert
witness testified for the defense); Cobey v. State, 559 A.2d 391, 398 (Md. App.
1989) (no expert testimony for the defense); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d
775, 783 (Va. 1989) (defendant "was unable to find or produce one qualified expert
to debunk either the theory of DNA printing or the statistics generated there-
from.")
62 "By the end [of the trial], all nine independent experts, including three
originally called by the prosecution would agree that no one could tell from the
tests Lifecodes performed in this case whether there was a match." Parloff, supra




The relevancy standard, the alternative to Frye, has gained increased
acceptance since it was adopted into the Federal Rules of Evidence. 63 The
relevancy test requires the court to balance the probative value of the
evidence against the possibility that the evidence will be prejudicial or
misleading to the jury.64 The evidence must be substantially prejudicial
or misleading before it will be excluded. 6
This rule reflects the general trend in courts over the past twenty years
to lower the barriers to the admission of scientific evidence. 66 Proponents
of this view maintain that probative evidence should be admitted with
contrary opinions expressed through the adversary process to attack the
weight of the evidence.6 DNA typing has been accepted as evidence in
several courts which applied the relevancy standard.6 8 DNA evidence does
not appear to substantially prejudice or mislead the jury if the claims of
highly probative and accurate identification are believed. The lack of
available experts hindered the defense from showing unreliability suf-
ficient to warrant exclusion of the evidence under the relevancy test.
However, some courts have followed the premise that "a scientist may
have no trouble accepting the general proposition that DNA typing can
be done reliably, yet still have doubts about the reliability of the test
being performed by a particular laboratory."69 This altered approach ap-
pears in People v. Castro,70 the first case to seriously challenge the reli-
ability of DNA typing.
In Castro, counsel for the defense, Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld,
contacted several scientists to learn enough about DNA typing to mount
a defense against its admission.' 1 Several experts contributed many hours
free of charge to educate and assist Scheck and Neufeld in their efforts
to question the reliability of the evidence.7 2 Their testimony challenging
the lab's analysis of a spot of blood found on the defendant's watchband
led experts for the prosecution to admit that procedures were not yet
ready to generate admissible evidence. 73
The relevancy test extends from the interaction of several rules of evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 401; FED. R. EVID. 402; FED. R. EVID. 403; FED. R. EVID. 702.
GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 52, at § 1-6(B).65Id. at § 1-6(C).
6 Giannelli, supra note 54, at 1199; Imwinkelried, supra note 23, at 555-56.
67 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 52, at § 1-6(D); Gianelli, supra note
54, at 1239. "Relevancy approach: The adversary process allows jurors to evaluate
novel scientific evidence in a manner substantially similar to other evidence."
Egesdal, supra note 28, at 1772.
68 United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990); Andrews v. State,
533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Caldwell v. State, 393 S.E.2d 436 (Ga.
1990); State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847 (N.C. 1990); Spencer v. Common-
wealth, 385 S.E.2d 850 (Va. 1989); State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W.Va. 1989).
69 Thompson & Ford, supra note 5, at 57-58.
70 People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (Supp. 1989).
1, Parloff, supra note 35, at 53.72 
Id.
11 See supra note 62.
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The judge in Castro, Gerald Scheindlin, in deciding to exclude the
inculpatory evidence, applied a three-pronged variation of the Frye test. 4
The first two prongs are the traditional Frye test. The third prong expands
Frye to include an examination of the lab procedures in a particular case,
ordinarily a question of weight of the evidence, not admissibility.75 The
court in Castro stated that "where the results are so unreliable... [they]
are inadmissible as a matter of law."76
Cases decided soon after Castro did not apply the three-pronged ad-
missibility test;7 7 Castro failed to set a uniform admissibility procedure
that state and federal courts would consistently follow. Legal experts
anticipated that the precedent setting decision would occur in United
States v. Yee.78 In Yee, Magistrate James E. Carr conducted a six-week
pre-trial hearing so extensive that it has been called a "scorched earth
review" of the field.7 9 After hearing testimony from thirteen leading sci-
entists, Magistrate Carr recommended admissibility. 0 The controversy
over DNA evidence appeared to be nearing an end.
Cases subsequently decided indicate, however, that judicial acceptance
is not universal. In United States v. Two Bulls,"' the court held that a
Castro hearing was necessary before admissibility whether the court fol-
lows the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Frye test. 2 The Alabama Su-
preme Court in Ex parte Perry u. State chose to adopt the three-pronged
Castro test for determining admissibility.8 3 Perry reiterates the concern
"that there can be errors in both the performance of the tests and the
interpretation, both of which can lead to an improper 'match."'' The court
in Perry recommended that prior to admission a hearing outside the
presence of the jury should be held to ensure proper performance of the
test in each case involving a challenge to the evidence.8 5
The strongest rejection of DNA evidence to date occurred on January
24, 1991, when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided
74 Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1989).
71 Id. (citing People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Albany County Ct. 1988)).
76 Id. at 997-98.
71 State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847 (N.C. 1990); Magistrate's Report, United
States v. Yee, No. 3:89CR0720, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15908 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26,
1990); State v. Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781 (S.C. 1990).
78 E. Donald Shapiro & Michelle L. Weinberg, DNA Data Banking: The Dan-
gerous Erosion of Privacy, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 455, 462 (1990) (reference to
Magistrate's Report, United States v. Yee, No. 3:89CR0720, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15908 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1990)).
79 Id.
80 Magistrate Carr's recommendation was adopted by the court in United States
v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (1991).
8' 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990).21 Id. at 60.
I' Ex Parte Perry v. State, No. 89-1534, 1991 Ala. LEXIS 323 (Ala. Apr. 19,
1991).





Commonwealth v. Curnin.86 The court held that, "we conclude that there
is no demonstrated general acceptance or inherent rationality of the process
by which Cellmark arrived at its conclusion ... ,"87 The court further
stated that, "a jury should not be given the evidence and allowed to
determine the validity and soundness of the process because evidence of
this character has too great a potential for affecting a jury's judgment."' ,
The court in Curnin did not rely on the Castro test of proper performance;
instead, the court ruled DNA evidence inadmissible under the traditional
Frye test. The court grounded its decision on the belief that:
Evidence of this nature, based on the scientific principle that
every human has unique genetic characteristics and having an
aura of infallibility, must have a strong impact on a jury. The
erroneous admission of such evidence would undoubtedly be
prejudicial in any case where, as here, the identification of the
person who committed the crime is in serious dispute. 9
The decision in Curnin reflects the paradoxical result that the Frye
test, a supposedly conservative admissibility standard, prematurely ad-
mitted evidence as generally accepted. DNA evidence was rejected in
Curnin because the prosecution did not show that the forensic application
of the technology was generally accepted by the scientific community.8 0
The opposing arguments did not differ significantly from prior DNA cases;
the difference was the court's position that "[t]he party offering the evi-
dence 'has the burden of showing the general acceptance by experts in
the field of the reliability."' 91 The court determined that the prosecution
had not met its burden.
2
It is possible to reconcile Yee and Curnin. The lengthy pre-trial hearing
which resulted in admissibility in Yee might satisfy the prosecution's
burden of showing general acceptance under Curnin. However, the ex-
tensive hearings are not likely to be repeated in every case with DNA
evidence. 3 Thus, despite the predictions of Yee's impact, a lack of judicial
consensus on DNA admissibility persists.
C. Summary
The courts' inability to agree on admissibility should not mean the
decision to admit evidence should be removed from the judiciary. The
6 565 N.E.2d 440 (1991).
87 Id. at 442.
88 Id. at 442, n.7 (emphasis added).
89 Id. at 441.
90 Id.
91 Commonwealth v. Curnin, 565 N.E.2d 440,443 (1991) (citing Commonwealth
v. Kater, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (Mass. 1983)).
92 In addition to the two cases presented in the text, a Superior Court Judge
in California ruled that prosecutors "had failed to show the preliminary hearing
judge that the DNA analysis was valid." Jerry Hicks, Rape Suspect's Case is
Dismissed: Improper DNA Procedure Cited, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1991, part B,
pg. 5. Since the DNA was the primary evidence, the case was dismissed. Id.
91 Shapiro & Weinberg, supra note 78, at 462.
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impact of the judicial decisions is not limited to the legal system. The
adversarial challenges, when they occur, goad the labs into improving
their methodology in order to withstand scrutiny. DNA evidence is often
withdrawn when a serious challenge to admissibility is anticipated,9 4
indicating an unwillingness to withstand the court's inquiry into the
typing process. More stringent protocols and procedures have been in-
stituted by the testing labs in response to weaknesses exposed by the
judicial process.5
With the current lack of uniform standards and controls, the courts
have been filing the gap by examining the procedures through scientific
debate in the courtroom. The admissibility hearings provide, at this time,
the only independent control over lab standards. Without judicial scru-
tiny, DNA testing labs will lose a primary source of impetus to improve
the reliability of their procedures.
III. LEGISLATIVE NOTICE OF DNA TYPING: THE STATUTES
A. An Overview
Judicial influence on the unregulated labs may have been eliminated
as several legislatures have implemented statutory measures making
DNA evidence admissible per se. Legislative notice of scientific evidence
is not unheard-of, but it is unusual for a still novel procedure to be
legislatively endorsed.
Legislative notice applies to several types of scientific evidence such as
radar,96 traditional blood analysis97 and intoxication testing.98 All of these
forms of evidence may be distinguished from DNA typing. Radar is used
to enforce regulatory statutes 99 which do not involve extensive depriva-
tions of life and/or liberty as do the sentences for rape and homicide most
commonly associated with DNA evidence. Intoxication testing involves
criminal sanctions, 0 0 but to a lesser degree than those imposed for rape
and homicide. Measurement of intoxication also requires immediate ac-
tion since it is a condition which changes rapidly,'0' unlike DNA which
permanently remains in the body.
Labaton, supra note 27.
91 Compare People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Supp. 1989) with Magistrate's
Report, United States v. Yee, No. 3:89CR0720, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15908(N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1990).
GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 52, at § 1-3; Giannelli, supra note
54, at 1203.
97 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 52, at § 1-3.
91 Id.; Giannelli, supra note 54, at 1203.
Giannelli, supra note 54, at 1203, n.34.
1o0Id.
10, The need for immediate action may allow an intoxication test without a





Blood analysis is closely analogous to DNA profiling. A blood sample
must be taken from the person to perform blood analysis; a blood sample
is commonly required for DNA testing. This intrusion into the body differs
from a procedure such as fingerprinting which is wholly external. The
Supreme Court held in Schmerber v. California0 2 that the intrusion of
taking a blood sample was not so extreme, unusual or unsafe as to be
violative of Fourth Amendment rights.103 Nonetheless, the intrusive na-
ture of obtaining a blood sample, considered with the immutability of
one's blood type (or DNA), underscores the need for probable cause before
a warrant may be obtained for the search. The stability of the sample
distinguishes both blood analysis and DNA typing from intoxication test-
ing.
Blood analysis and DNA typing may be distinguished by the infor-
mation the tests generate. Blood typing statistical information estimates
the probability of a random match into the one-in-hundreds as opposed
to the one-in-millions of DNA typing results.10 4 While statistics of one-
in-one hundred certainly favor the probability of suspect identification,
the DNA statistics virtually single out an individual. In this capacity,
the DNA statistics weigh heavily in the outcome of a trial. If the labo-
ratory statistics are believed, little room remains for reasonable doubt.
DNA evidence also lacks a solid background in scientific publication,
replication and validation, unlike previously accepted forms of scientific
evidence. 10 5 Radar, blood analysis and intoxication testing generally had
a long history of judicial acceptance by judicial notice before their ac-
ceptance by the legislature.10 6 Only a few courts have extended judicial
notice to DNA typing."7
Six states (Louisiana, Minnesota, Indiana, Maryland, Virginia and Ten-
nessee) have chosen to take the unprecedented course of legislative ac-
ceptance of a still novel scientific technique. The states have taken similar
approaches in admitting the evidence, but the statutes vary in their scope.
B. Louisiana
The statute adopted by the Louisiana legislature states that evidence
of DNA profiles offered to establish the identity of the offender of any
crime is relevant evidence. 08 Use of the term "relevant evidence" is con-
102 Id. at 771.
1031d.
"14 Traditional blood typing results are stated as one in 100 probability of a
random match. Hoeffel, supra note 3, at 469, n.18. Compare with cases cited supra
note 25.
11- See supra notes 30-36 & accompanying text.
106 Id.
107 DNA has been judicially noticed by the courts in two states. See State v.
Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781, 784 (S.C. 1990); State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253, 260
(W.Va. 1989).
10 "Evidence of deoxyribonucleic acid profiles... offered to establish the iden-
tity of the offender of any crime is relevant as proof in conformity with the
Louisiana Code of Evidence." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441.1 (West 1989).
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sistent with Louisiana's adoption of the relevancy standard in State v.
Calanese.0 9 It may be inferred from the statute's language that the leg-
islature sought to establish a rule which holds the probative value of the
DNA is not outweighed by the likelihood that it could prejudice, mislead
or distract the jury from a fair ruling on the issues.11o In so doing, the
legislature entered an area in which the trial judges have generally op-
erated with much leeway.' Ordinarily, it is the role of the judge to weigh
factors of probative value to admit or exclude the evidence.1 2
When it is the trial judge who weighs the value of the evidence, a basis
for appeal lies in abuse of discretion. Appellate courts generally defer to
the trial judge unless there has been a showing of clear abuse by an
arbitrary and irrational decision.' 3 Since no challenges to the Louisiana
statute have yet arisen, it is not clear whether the appellate courts will
view the legislative discretion in the same manner as judicial discretion.
C. Minnesota
In Minnesota, the legislature adopted several provisions for DNA test-
ing as part of an omnibus crime bill." 4 While the inclusion of DNA testing
with other crime related topics may be logical, the volume of issues re-
duces the likelihood of exploratory debate on any one section. The floor
reports of the bill exhibit no material changes in the DNA language
between committee drafts"' which may indicate little consideration of
this important issue.
The legislature now requires" 6 the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension
(BCA) to develop uniform procedures and protocols for the collection,
preservation and analysis of DNA specimens and to establish a central-
- 368 So. 2d 975, 980 (La. 1979).
110 See supra notes 63-67 & accompanying text.
... MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
112 Id.
113 Id. See also Ohio v. Blair, No. 2659, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5812 (Ohio App.
Dec. 24, 1990) (court overrules assignments of error based on court's discretion
to admit DNA testimony). But see United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th
Cir. 1990) (court finds reversible error when lower court did not conduct Castro-
type hearing).
114 H.B. 59, authored by Reps. Kelly and Vellenga (available from Minnesota
Legislative Reference).
115 Id.
"I The statute states in relevant part:
Subdivision 2. Uniform evidence collection. The bureau shall develop uni-
form procedures and protocols for collecting evidence ... including proce-
dures and protocols for the collection and preservation of human biological
specimens for DNA analysis.
Subdivision 3. DNA analysis and data bank. The bureau shall adopt uniform
procedures and protocols to maintain, preserve, and analyze human biolog-
ical specimens for DNA.




ized data base 1 7 for the information obtained from analysis. The data is
to be available to law enforcement officials, prosecutors and the individual
subjects of the data upon request.I's A second statute19 requires the courts
to order persons convicted of sexual offenses to provide a specimen for
DNA analysis to be included in the DNA data bank.
The statutes do not specify what type of information will be available
to the defendant. Errors which may occur during the testing process would
not be apparent from the final lab report.' 2 Requirements of procedural
data are not included in the statute making it likely that only the final
statement would be given to the defendant. The lack of copious docu-
mentation seriously impairs the ability to present an adequate defense
to this evidence.
Another statute specifically addresses admissibility. The statute states
that DNA test results are admissible as evidence in court without an-
tecedent expert testimony as to their reliability and trustworthiness.'
2
1
Defense counsel is precluded from engaging in limine hearings to deter-
mine the reliability of the individual test. The defense is left to rely solely
on cross-examination to refute the evidence.
While the legislature has made the effective challenging of evidence
through cross-examination quite difficult by not providing for extensive
lab documentation, a more serious obstacle may await the defendant in
yet another admissibility statute. A statute was later added which allows
DNA evidence to be admitted even if it was obtained outside of the state.
122
17 One of the strengths of DNA testing is its adaptability to digitalization.
Tande, supra note 38, at 481. Statewide data bases are created using the meth-
odology of the lab. Differences in lab techniques between states will prevent an
exchange of information between data bases. Parloff, supra note 35, at 56; PR
NEWSWIRE, supra note 16 (DNA technology will not realize its full potential until
national standards allow all facilities to work together).
DNA data bases raise privacy concerns for all individuals. Controls on access
to the information may not adequately prevent misuse of genetic data. See Shapiro
& Weinberg, supra note 78; Susan Katz Miller, Genetic Privacy Makes Strange
Bedfellows, 249 SCIENCE 1368 (1990).
'8 A total of $1.5 million was appropriated to the BCA to create the DNA
tracing system. Joe Tougas, State Soon to Use DNA Tracking, MANKOTA FREE
PRESS, July 3, 1989, at 9 (available from Minnesota Legislative Reference)..
119 MINN. STAT. § 609.3461 (1989).
120 Neufeld & Colman describe the lack of written explanation in final reports
by suggesting that: "it would be unthinkable for a diagnostic laboratory to deliver
to the obstetrician of a pregnant woman an unsigned report with only the word
'abort' appearing on the page." Neufeld & Coleman, supra note 3, at 53. See also
Ohio v. Blair, No. 2659, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5812 (Ohio App. Dec. 24, 1990)
(defense expert unable to form an opinion as to test validity due to lack of infor-
mation in the final report).
121 In a civil or criminal trial or hearing, the results of DNA analysis ...
are admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that DNA
analysis provides a trustworthy and reliable method of identifying char-
acteristics in an individual's genetic material upon a showing that the
offered testimony meets the standards for admissibility set forth in the Rules
of Evidence.
MINN. STAT. 634.25 (1989).
122 "Relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal trial or hearing
... on the ground that it existed or was obtained outside of this state." MINN.
STAT. § 634.30 (1990).
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This statute partially negates the standards the legislature imposed upon
the BCA's laboratories. The statutes taken collectively would seem to
allow any DNA evidence from any lab to be admitted as reliable and
trustworthy evidence.
It is likely that all chain of custody witnesses necessary to discover
possible lab errors would be difficult to obtain from out-of-state facilities.
An out-of-state lab may not comply with Minnesota's statutory lab stand-
ards, yet the presumption of reliability would still exist. If the reliability
of the test is presumed, the court may choose to allow minimal verification
of procedures.1 23 These permissive conditions leave the defendant with
virtually no confrontational ability despite an opportunity to cross-ex-
amine available witnesses.
Problems also exist between the legislative determination of admissi-
bility and portions of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. Rule of Evidence
104 states: "Preliminary questions concerning ... the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court ... 1124 The Comment to this
section states "Rule 104 sets out the relative function of the judge and
jury in the trial process. '125 It should be noted that the role of the legis-
lature in the trial process is conspicuously absent. While the Rules of
Evidence empower the court to determine admissibility, the legislature
has claimed this power for itself when DNA typing is at issue.
Judicial confrontation of legislative intervention into evidentiary mat-
ters has already occurred in Minnesota. The legislature adopted a statute
that makes statistical population frequency evidence derived from the
DNA testing admissible. 126 A statute specifically addressing statistical
information would generally not be included in most state statutory
schemes because statistical evidence is treated as any other form of evi-
dence in most states. The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, limited
the use of population frequency statistics due to the potentially exagger-
ated impact they may have on a jury.127 The legislature directly precluded
12
3 An Ohio court recently overruled an assignment of error based on failure
to establish proper chain of custody. The court found the testimony of a lab
technician was sufficient. Ohio v. Blair, No. 2659, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 5812.
The same result could occur under the Federal Rules of Evidence which allow
technicians to verify lab tests. FED. R. EVID. 901 (a), (b)(9). But see Hicks, supra
note 27 (lack of foundation for DNA testimony results in exclusion of the evidence.)
124 MINN. R. EVID. 104 (amended December 28, 1989, effective January 1, 1990.)
115 Committee Comment to Rule 104 (1977).
126 MINN. STAT. § 634.26 (1989).
127 State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422,428 n.5 (Minn. 1989). The court's decision
in Schwartz followed precedent. State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544 (Minn.
1987); State v. Boyd, 331 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. 1983); State v. Carlson, 267 N.W.2d
170 (Minn. 1978). Other states have no such limitation and have not followed
Minnesota. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d at 429. But see United States v. Two
Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing to Joon Kyu Kim and Schwartz in
requiring courts to weigh probative value and prejudicial effect on DNA statistics




this holding by making statistical evidence admissible by statute. 2 8 The
Hennepin County Court declared this statutory provision unconstitu-
tional "because it violates the separation of powers clause of the Min-
nesota Constitution by invading an essentially judicial function - the
power to determine admissibility of evidence. '1 2 9 The court did not, how-
ever, rule against the statute admitting evidence of the test itself. Yet,
the decision effectively limited the impact of the legislative actions by
excluding the powerful statistical inferences without extending any fur-
ther than needed for the specific case.
The Minnesota Supreme Court later commented: "we also remind the
bench and bar that we have not addressed or decided whether Minn. Stat.
634.26 (Supp. 1989), providing for the admission of statistical probability
evidence relating to DNA test results, has the effect of legislatively cre-
ating an exception for DNA evidence . . .".130 After this caveat of non-
decision, the court continued with a strong indication of its view of the
statute by citing a discussion "of the separation of powers doctrine and
the recognition therein that this court, not the legislature, has the pri-
mary responsibility for adopting rules relating to the admission of evi-
dence in trials."1 1
The separation of powers argument offered by the Minnesota courts
may be adopted by other courts to strike general admissibility statutes.
If the defense can show flaws so egregious that a court could not reason-
ably admit the evidence, the statute presuming reliability would be ripe
for attack. The court may be moved by such a miscarriage of justice to
exclude the evidence as part of its powers, thereby necessitating comment
on the admissibility statute.
D. Indiana
Challenges to the constitutionality of DNA statutes are also likely to
occur in Indiana. Governor Evan Bayh signed House Bill 1357 into law
despite his publicized concerns that the DNA provisions were unconsti-
tutional. 3 2 The lengthy bill contained authorization for the development
of a DNA data bank133 as well as a provision almost identical to the
128 Michele Cook, High-tech genetic test will be used in trial, ST. PAUL PIONEER
DISPATCH, July 19, 1989, at 1C (available from Minnesota Legislative Service)
(quoting Assistant Attorney General Bill Klumpp who helped draft H.B. 59 as
saying "In essence, what the Legislature did is overrule the Supreme Court.")
129 UPI, Sept. 7, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file. Judge Mi-
chael Davis is quoted as saying that the statute "directly interferes with the
inherent power of the courts to establish rules of evidence and must be declared
unconstitutional." Id.
13I State v. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d 615, 620 (Minn. 1991).
131 Id.
132 James Grass, Bayh OK's Bill on Taping of Child-Abuse Testimony, Gannett
News Service, March 27, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (expressing
concern about ongoing scientific debate over DNA testing and the intrusion into
the court's power to weigh evidence.)
1,3 IND. CODE § 20-12-34.5 (1990).
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Minnesota law admitting DNA evidence in criminal trials.13 4 However,
the bulk of the legislation concerned child abuse and child pornography,
issues which prompted Governor Bayh's signature."35
This bill, weighted with many diverse issues, is even more cluttered
than Minnesota's omnibus crime bill. The bill was virtually ensured pas-
sage due to sections addressing child abuse and pornography, as is evi-
denced by the Governor's reluctant endorsement. Press releases concern-
ing the bill's passage centered on the child welfare issues with little
comment on the ramifications of DNA acceptance.136 This dearth of press
coverage may indicate lack of debate in the legislature over passage of
the admissibility statute.
The bill also provided that DNA population statistics will be made
available to persons who have paid a required fee.1 37 This issue raises
questions of access to information for the indigent defendant. The statis-
tics are vital for defense examination of the final DNA testing results.138
Denial of the information to the indigent results in impermissible pro-
cedural differences based solely on ability to pay. 1" 9 Refusal to grant the
information to an indigent defendant should be considered a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights.
Criminal defendants in Indiana may also have another objection unique
to the circumstances. Due to a printing error, the bill was not sent to the
Governor before the legislature adjourned, as is required by Indiana
law. 140 Whether or not the bill properly cleared the legislature remains
to date an issue for adjudication.' 4 '
E. Maryland
The Maryland statute differs from others in that it provides for notice
to the defendant of the intent to use DNA evidence and provides for the
114 IND. CODE § 35-37-4-13 (1991) reads in part: "In a criminal trial or hearing,
the results of forensic DNA analysis are admissible in evidence without ante-
cedent expert testimony that forensic DNA analysis provides a trustworthy and
reliable method of identifying characteristics in an individual's genetic material."
'35 Grass, supra note 132.
L36 Id.
'37 IND. CODE 20-12-34.5 § 5 (1990).
'asSee supra note 120.
The argument to provide information would be based on Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal trial procedures should not be discriminatory on the
basis of wealth) and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1983) (determine necessity
of assistance by examining the fundamental fairness of the proceedings). The
argument is supported by court decisions mandating expanded discovery to pro-
vide necessary information. Magistrate's Report, United States v. Yee, No.
3:89CR0720, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15908 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1990) (defense
entitled to extensive discovery of FBI information); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d
985, 999 (Supp. 1989) (list of items the court would include in discovery).





presence of any person in the chain of custody as a witness. 142 This lan-
guage reinforces the relevancy approach by allowing evidence to be eval-
uated through the adversary process. 143 The presence of chain of custody
witnesses provides the opportunity for extensive cross-examination con-
cerning lab procedure. The statute is similar to other DNA statutes in
that it proclaims DNA admissible per se.
The floor report of House Bill 711'4 contains a clear statement of leg-
islative intent: "The intent of the bill is to eliminate the necessity of
holding a 'Frye-Reed' hearing to prove that the technique has gained
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community."'" 5 It further
states that it has been "scientifically established"146 that techniques have
been developed which "can be performed with a level of scientific accuracy
that approaches near certainty.'
147
The Maryland legislature reached these conclusions after hearings and
committee reports. The speakers included prominent members of the
DNA typing community, the legal community and persons familiar with
blood testing. 148 No speaker addressed the legislature from a public de-
fender's office or civil liberties organization. 149 The lack of defense-ori-
ented witnesses indicates an imbalance of interests presented at the pro-
ceedings. While scientists may debate fair lab procedures, defense ad-
vocates should be present to debate fair trial procedures.
The prepared statement of John W. Hicks, Deputy Assistant Director
of the FBI Laboratory Division, 150 provides insight into the testimony
that led the legislature to its conclusions. Mr. Hicks proactively addressed
issues which had been DNA's Achilles heel: lack of publication,"' scant
research, 152 lack of standards,1 53 and lack of proficiency testing.14 His
position was buttressed by reference to crime laboratories across the coun-
try which were beginning DNA testing. 155 Mr. Hicks characterized some
DNA tests as having "the discriminating power ... to the point that the
tests virtually identify a single individual. 1 56 Like early expert testimony
14 2 MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-915 (1989).
141 The Maryland courts, however, follow the more conservative Frye doctrine.
See Cobey v. State, 559 A.2d 391 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
144 Available from Maryland Department of Legislative Reference.
145 Floor Report, HB 711 [hereinafter Floor Report] (available from Maryland
Department of Legislative Reference).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 The House Judiciary Committee List of Speakers and Interested Parties
(available from Maryland Department of Legislative Reference) lists speakers
and their affiliations as: John W. Huss, Cellmark Diagnostics; John W. Hicks,
FBI; Teresa M. Gronert, Maryland State Police Crime Laboratory; Francis A.
Chiafari and Terry D. Houtz, Baltimore Rh Typing Lab.
149 Id.
1"0 Hicks Statement, supra note 30.
"I Id. at 1, 6-7.
152 Id. at 3-4.
113 Id. at 9.
154 Hicks Statement, supra note 30, at 4.
1"5 Id. at 5, 7.
116 Id. at 6.
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in the courts, the accuracy and reliability of DNA testing was once again
presented as a nearly infallible form of criminal identification. The
legislature was also addressed by a representative of Cellmark Diagnos-
tics, Inc., a Maryland-based genetic testing laboratory.1 5 7 While this local
influence may have played a role in the bill's passage, it is more likely
that the bill passed without many changes 5 8 in much the same way as
early DNA typing was admitted into the courts: through lack of a strong
adversarial viewpoint at the legislative hearings.
F. Virginia
Virginia passed its admissibility statute as it created a DNA testing
laboratory. 59 While its predominant function appears to be law enforce-
ment support, the creation of the lab would have aided suspect identifi-
cation in and of itself. Perhaps the admissibility statute serves to insure
the state's sizable investment in DNA technology by guaranteeing that
the fruits of the labs will be used with a minimum of restraint.
The Virginia statute states that DNA testing shall be deemed a reliable
scientific technique and that evidence of a DNA profile may be admitted
to prove or disprove the identity of any person.160 The opponent must be
notified and be given access to profiles, reports and statements at least
21 days prior to the commencement of the proceedings. 161 The statute also
provides that, if the opponent wishes to object to admissibility, he must
do so at least ten days prior to trial. 62 These provisions promote judicial
economy by deeming DNA evidence admissible should the opponent not
object,' r and by providing procedural safeguards for notice and discovery
in excess of other statues. 164 Not only is the time for notice more generous,
but the statute explicitly provides for the disclosure of the profiles them-
selves and not just the final report or statement. Possession of the profiles
would assist the defense in obtaining an independent analysis to assist
in confrontation of the evidence at trial.
A second statute outlines standards to be utilized by the Bureau of
Forensic Sciences in performing the test and in maintaining confiden-
157 Cellmark Diagnostics Corporation is located at 20271 Goldenrod Lane, Ger-
mantown, Maryland 20874.
11"The Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee recommended an amendment
to the title and the addition of the chain of custody witness provision while the
House Judiciary Committee was mostly concerned with technical requirements
of analysis, a change which was not made to the final bill. Floor Report, supra
note 145.
159 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.5 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.4 (1990).








tiality of the records.165 The statutes also make at least a cursory attempt




The most recent state to adopt DNA admissibility statutes is Tennessee.
Its statutes are clearly patterned after the other states', most closely
resembling those of Minnesota. Section 1 of the Tennessee Act addresses
the administrative aspects of creating a testing laboratory with proce-
dures for collecting, preserving and analyzing specimens.'6 7 Section 2
authorizes the creation of a data bank for sex offenders' DNA prints.' 68
Both of these sections offer little change from previously discussed stat-
utory provisions in other states.
Section 3 sets forth DNA admissibility in the almost boilerplate lan-
guage: "reliable and trustworthy without antecedent testimony to
such.' ' 69 Tennessee then diverged from other statutory schemes by in-
cluding a provision that the statute is not intended to preclude challenges
to expert testimony or to the reliability of the DNA evidence itself.'7' It
appears that the statute would allow only unchallenged evidence to be
admitted without a foundation establishing reliability while it arguably
leaves the door open to in limine proceedings should the defense so move.
A potential problem exists in the overly optimistic timeline for imple-
mentation of the statute as provided by the legislature. Section 5 of the
Act states that the lab shall begin section 1 operations (collection, pres-
ervation and analysis) on June 4, 1991, "the public welfare requiring
it."' The remaining provisions (data base and admissibility) were de-
layed until July 1, 1991.172 This allowed the lab very little time to perfect
the DNA typing to levels warranting automatic admissibility.
H. Summary
The DNA admissibility statutes as a whole repudiate the trend of the
courts to require a pre-trial hearing on the reliability of DNA testing 73
and to undergo a "case- and fact-specific"' 74 analysis of the potentially
165 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.4 (1990).
161 Cf. supra note 116 & accompanying text.




171 1991 Tenn. Pub. Acts 480.
172 Id.
173 See generally People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Supp. 1989).
174 Magistrate's Report, United States v. Yee, No. 3:89CRO720, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15908, at *157-58 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1990).
19911
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1991
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
prejudicial effect of the evidence. These statutes which impinge on the
court's discretion to determine admissibility may lead other legislatures
to enact similar provisions thereby constricting judicial discretion in ev-
identiary matters.
Despite their ability to conduct extensive hearings on DNA testing, the
legislatures reached conclusions inconsistent with the majority of courts
and Congress' Office of Technology Assessment. While the judiciary and
the national legislature recommend careful examination of DNA typing,
state legislatures have determined that DNA testing need not undergo
scrutiny prior to presentation at trial. These findings will offer the labs
little incentive to improve, or to even maintain, their current questionable
level of reliability.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE ACCEPTANCE
The legislatures have, in general, abolished pre-trial hearings to de-
termine the admissibility of DNA evidence. In spite of legislative action
to admit the evidence, the courts still retain the power to interpret the
statutes. In those states where higher court decisions have upheld the
use of DNA evidence,'17 5 it is likely that the courts will routinely admit
the evidence although the decision may not be based on the statute. Since
case law in the jurisdiction would have already set precedent in accepting
the DNA evidence, the courts may choose to follow precedent without
reference to the statute.176 This action would be of little assistance to the
defendant since the result would be inclusion of potentially unreliable
evidence. The distinction would be academic: the courts would resist leg-
islative interference with judicial proceedings.
A statute admitting DNA may, however, conflict with existing judicial
opinion as is true in Minnesota where the legislature has expressly con-
fronted the judiciary in statutorily admitting statistical results of DNA
testing over judicial precedent. 7 7 The Minnesota courts have indicated a
strong inclination to resist this enactment. 78 Although no case has
reached the Minnesota Supreme Court directly challenging the statute,
it is apparent that the court will favor its prior rulings to the recent
statutory provision. Under similar circumstances in other states, it is
equally likely that statutes admitting DNA evidence would be subjected
to the same close, possibly hostile, scrutiny.
175 For example, Virginia courts have admitted DNA evidence. Spencer v. Com-
monwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775 (Va. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 759 (1990); Spencer
v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785 (Va. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1171 (1990);
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 850 (Va. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1171 (1990).
178 The courts tend to preserve the power of case law when interpreting new
statutes. Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C.L. REv. 367, 387 (1988).
"I See supra notes 127-30 & accompanying text.
171 See State v. Nielsen, 467 N.W.2d 615, 620 (Minn. 1991); State v. Schwartz,




Even without expressly negating the statutes, the court may attempt
to counteract undue legislative influence through cautionary instructions
to the jury. 79 The legislature has conclusively decided a narrow issue of
fact - that DNA tests are reliable and trustworthy - but the legislature
cannot interfere with the jury's independent weighing of the evidence.
Legislative determination of a fact so crucial to identification would ef-
fectively deny the right to trial by jury.180
When the court takes judicial notice in a criminal case, Federal Rule
of Evidence 201 requires that cautionary instructions be given to the
jury."" Applied by analogy to legislatively noticed DNA evidence, the
judge should instruct the jury that "it may, but is not required to, accept
as conclusive" the reliability of the test. 82 Under Federal Rule 201, the
court must allow for dispute by counsel of a judicially noticed fact.183 The
courts may extend this provision to allow dispute of the legislatively
noticed fact of reliability, thus resurrecting the in limine proceeding.
Pre-trial admissibility hearings may be possible on other grounds as
well. As Justice Blackmun stated in his dissent in Barefoot v. Estelle:
TM
Indeed, unreliable scientific evidence is widely acknowledged
to be prejudicial. The reasons for this are manifest. "The major
danger of scientific evidence is its potential to mislead the jury;
an aura of scientific infallibility may shroud the evidence and
thus lead the jury to accept it without critical scrutiny."''1 5
A well-founded claim of potential prejudicial impact may require the
courts to conduct an admissibility hearing to determine if the relevance
of the DNA is substantially outweighed by its possible negative impact.
At the very least, this tactic will preserve the issue for appeal.
While the statutes admitting DNA evidence treat it as a unique form
of evidence necessitating specific statutory approval, they routinely ne-
glect issues of obtaining the sample. Several states are beginning to create
DNA data banks whereby DNA samples are digitally encoded into a
computer database. 8 6 Theoretically, the data bank could produce the
179 Giannelli, supra note 54, at 1238. Cautionary instructions are appropriate
when a fact has been judicially noticed in order to instruct the jury not to sub-
stitute the judgment of the court for their own assessment of the evidence. This
is necessary to preserve the right to a jury trial. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 52, at § 1-2.
18 0 HOUSE COMM- ON JUDICIARY, FED. R. EVID., H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7080.
181 FED. R. EVID. 201(g).
182 Id.
183 FED. R. EVID. 201(e).
18 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
185 Id. at 926 (citing Giannelli, supra note 54, at 1237.)
188 See e.g. ARIz- REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-281 (1989); CAL. PEN. CODE § 290.2
(Deering, 1990); CoLo- REV. STAT. § 17-2-201 (1989); FLA. STAT. § 943.325 (1989);
1190 IowA ADVANCE LEGIS. SERV. 2413, 1990 IA. SF 2413, 73rd General Assembly
(1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.43.758 (West 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.43.754 (West 1990); See also, Shapiro & Weinberg, supra note 78, at 473-74.
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name of one individual whose DNA best matches the DNA left at a crime
scene. Without questioning the underlying validity or reliability of the
test yielding the initial information, the courts may have to decide if a
computer match constitutes cause enough to compel a new sample. 18 7
Legislative acceptance of DNA typing as reliable evidence may be suf-
ficient to provide probable cause should a match occur. The legislative
endorsement of reliability may encourage wide-scale testing and prelim-
inary identification based predominantly on a DNA print.
A search and seizure to obtain genetic information for a DNA data
bank pursuant to a Virginia statute has been challenged as unreasona-
ble. 18  Plaintiffs argued that since the search is conducted to store infor-
mation for future criminal investigations, the requisite probable cause
for a search has not yet arisen because no crime has occurred at the time
of the search. The court held that the countervailing state interests in
detecting suspects and deterring crime constituted a special need which
outweighed both the necessity for probable cause and the individual's
right to privacy. 18 9 It is important to note that the plaintiffs were convicted
felons whose right to privacy is not commensurate with that of the pop-
ulation at large.1 90
Nonetheless, the danger exists that the proliferation of DNA testing
could lead to an expansion of warrantless searches based on the state's
special need to detect suspects. Since DNA testing is closely analogous
to blood typing, it should be governed by the same procedures protecting
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure. 19' Accord-
ingly, it may be assumed that in the routine case probable cause is nec-
essary to obtain a DNA specimen. 92 Since DNA neither changes nor
vanishes from a person's body, a lesser standard for obtaining a warrant
should not be used.
The ease with which the State may admit DNA evidence under the
statutes will offer incentive to use it more frequently.193 In Britain, vol-
untary testing of an entire population occurred in conjunction with a
homicide investigation.94 It is unlikely that this would occur in the
I'l Thompson & Ford propose that:
where a suspect is initially identified by searching a large data base of DNA
prints for individuals who match the DNA print of a forensic sample, the
existence of the match is much weaker evidence of guilt than where the
suspect was initially identified due to factors having nothing to do with
genetics ... the evidence that his DNA type matches that of a forensic
sample may be insufficiently probative to be admissible in evidence against
him.
Thompson & Ford, supra note 5, at 100.
181 Jones v. Murray, 59 U.S.L.W. 2699 (D.Va. March 4, 1991).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
191 Cobey v. State, 559 A.2d 391, 398-99 (Md. App. 1989) (judicial comment on
lack of search warrant for blood test but issue not preserved for review).
193 Pearsall, supra note 38, at 675 (projects hundreds of thousands, perhaps
millions, of tests per year).




United States since social pressure to be tested would probably be viewed
as more coercive than voluntary.195
However, the FBI's Deputy Assistant Director, Laboratory Division,
suggested that "as suspects are developed by investigators, they may be
exonerated through DNA tests and investigators may redirect and narrow
their search for the perpetrator."'' 96 This position does not vary greatly
with the wide-scale testing conducted in Britain. When viewed in con-
junction with the trend toward lowering the requisite standard of cause
before a search,'9 7 there is a strong possibility that the courts may be
asked to clarify probable cause necessary for compelling a sample.
Statutory provisions for notice of intent to test may be deficient. Since
there would usually not be any emergency conditions necessitating im-
mediate DNA sampling'98 a notice of intent to test should accompany the
warrant to obtain a sample. Early notice of intent to test will protect the
right to confront the evidence and to prepare a defense by allowing early
access to the procedure. 199
The right to retest 200 would be the optimal benefit to early notice of
testing; however, the forensic setting rarely provides samples large
enough to survive the initial test.20 1 Theoretically, early notice would
provide the defendant opportunity to retain an independent expert to
oversee the testing procedure, a kind of concurrent testing. In this scen-
ario, the expert would be able to help the defense prepare its case by
offering extensive information of lab procedure. In reality, independent
forensic DNA specialists are not yet widely available. The defendant must
rely on independent analysis of the test results. 2 0 2 Prompt notice would
allow the defense ample time to locate experts to conduct post-test anal-
ysis.
1 Tande, supra note 38, at 475.
196 Hicks Statement, supra note 30, at 8.
197 See Jones v. Murray, 59 U.S.L.W. 2699 (1991); Hoeffel, supra note 3, at 527-
33.
198 Williams, supra note 38, at 26.
199 People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Supp. 1989) (supports early notice of
defendant).
2- Barnard v. Henderson, 574 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970). However, consumption of the sample is
usually not a violation if it is consumed during a necessary test. GIANNELLI &
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 52, at § 3-6.
201 Sherman, supra note 32.
10, A DNA consulting firm, Forensic and Scientific Consultions, Inc., of Albany,
New York is available to assist defendants at a fee of $200 per hour. Court
testimony is limited to no more than $900 per day plus expenses and transpor-
tation. Expert on DNA is Appointed to Assist Indigent Defendant, N.Y.L.J., July
4, 1991, at 21.
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Defense experts are necessary to prepare an adequate defense and to
afford effective counsel. 203 Analysis of the procedures requires a greater
understanding of lab protocol than the average attorney possesses.20 4 In
recognition of this fact, the FBI routinely provides assistance to the State
in preparation for trial, and private laboratories have prepared primers
to aid prosecuting attorneys in understanding the evidence.20 No such
aids exist to assist defense attorneys. The statutes which virtually guar-
antee a confrontation over DNA do nothing to similarly guarantee access
to necessary assistance. Automatic admissibility of DNA prints will in-
crease the number of tests performed, most of which are performed to
solve violent crimes. The defendants in these cases "come predominantly
from the less affluent sectors of society" and they often rely on court-
appointed attorneys. 20 6 It is highly unlikely that forensic specialists could
be retained with the funds available to such clients.
An argument may be made under Ake v. Oklahoma 2 7 that defense
experts are necessary to the "fundamental fairness" of the trial since
expert assistance is needed to defend against DNA typing, evidence that
will likely be integral to the prosecution's case. A New York court ap-
pointed expert assistance to an indigent defendant by relying on its dis-
cretionary powers rather than on a constitutional challenge. 08 The
discretionary power was based, nonetheless, upon the same argument
that the lack of expert assistance would undermine the fundamental
fairness of the trial. The court allowed the appointment of experts by
finding that expert assistance was necessary to the defense to confront
DNA evidence.209 However, reliance on court- appointed expert assistance
can be a dubious venture. Recent cases in Oklahoma and Alabama show
a refusal by the courts to authorize funds to retain defense experts. 210
Defense counsel must be sure to preserve a challenge to such a refusal
for subsequent appeal purposes. A combination of factors discussed in
this section would make a constitutionally mandated fair trial virtually
203 Labaton, supra note 27 (lack of funding available to defense); Giannelli,
supra note 54, at 1243-45.
204 Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence
- A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 261, 272-73 (most attorneys receive little or no training in evaluating the
weight of scientific evidence); Parloff, supra note 35, at 52 (defending DNA is
beyond the scope of what one attorney can do); Labaton, supra note 27 (lack of
resources available to defense often results in lunch-time pleas for help to Peter
J. Neufeld, defense attorney in Castro).
205 BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, supra note 34.
200 Neufeld & Colman, supra note 3, at 53.
207 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (psychiatric experts necessary to confront State's evidence
when evidence was substantial to the case and the lack of experts would under-
mine the fundamental fairness of the trial).
20 People v. Barnes, N.Y.L.J., July 1, 1991, at 21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991, unre-
ported).
209 Id.




impossible. If the evidence is admitted under the statutes without ques-
tion of reliability and the defense has only a statement of test results but
no expert to assist and testify, then the defendant may assert one or more
violations of his constitutional rights.2 1 1 The potential violations include:
the due process right to present a defense, the right to effective assistance
of counsel, the right to obtain witnesses in his favor and the right to
effectively cross-examine witnesses.
21 2
V. PROPOSED AREAS OF LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION
A. The DNA Typing Standards Board
The potential for numerous constitutional violations draws into ques-
tion the wisdom of legislative interference in DNA admissibility. How-
ever, this does not mean that the legislature should remain silent on the
future of DNA typing. The legislature has regulatory powers which the
court does not.2 1 3 It is in the area of laboratory regulation that the leg-
islature should direct its efforts rather than passing legislation which
intrudes into the court's domain of deciding evidentiary issues.
National standards need to be adopted and implemented to assure both
proper lab techniques and uniform application of the resulting infor-
mation. As a result the current problem of questionable reliability may
be eliminated and the promise of an accurate and effective forensic tool
may be realized.
The OTA report cites the need for standard procedures but adds that
there is no scientific agreement at this time for what constitutes proper
performance. 214 It is highly unlikely that DNA testing will simply dis-
appear until scientific agreement is reached on proper performance stand-
ards. A form of control is urgently needed in the meantime.
Many of the problems currently facing DNA typing could be addressed
if Congress were to create a DNA Typing Standards Board (DTSB) com-
prised of independent research and forensic scientists. The DTSB could
examine currently existing lab procedures and adopt one set of standards
that incorporate the best measures currently available. Standards should
be adopted to regulate the following aspects of DNA typing:
1. Collecting and preserving physical evidence from the crime scene
so as to note possible sources of contamination and prevent future con-
tamination and degradation.
215
211 Hoeffel, supra note 3, at 520, n.329.
.2 Id. at 520 n.329 (1),(3),(4) & (5).
213 Pearsall, supra note 38, at 697-98 (the courts have no power to mandate
standards while the legislature may conduct hearings to discover pertinent in-
formation, fund programs and enforce controls).
214 Sherman, supra note 49.
215 Pearsall, supra note 38, at 668-69; Beeler & Wiebe, supra note 3, at 921-
22; Tande, supra note 38, at 481.
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2. Minimum sample size necessary to conduct adequate testing and
controls. 216 A sample below the minimum size should not be tested. In an
effort to get results, the lab may skimp on controls and generate unre-
liable results. The labs should err on the side of caution and report that
no sample is available for testing under these circumstances.
3. Standardized probe use during hybridization. 217 No standards cur-
rently exist for the number or type of probes used to create the DNA
print.218 Research into the reliability of specific probes needs to be con-
tinued. As new probes enter the market, standards for their use should
accompany them. Uniformity in the number and type of probes used for
testing is necessary to ensure reliability from case to case. Consistent
exposure to similar results will decrease the novelty of the evidence to
all parties concerned and increase familiarity with the technique. Fa-
miliarity with standard results will aid the defense in adequate prepa-
ration and will demystify the process for the jury.
4. Standardized procedures including detailed control protocols. 21 9 The
DTSB should study the variety of controls currently in use and recom-
mend the type and number of controls necessary to detect lab aberrations.
5. Analytical parameters. DNA profiles are currently being declared
"matches" by the FBI when the bands are within + /- 2.5% of each other.220
This standard allows a five percent total variation when deciding if two
bands are the same. This "match window" is larger than those used by
other labs, which means that the FBI will potentially call a match where
other labs would find none. 221 The DTSB should determine and subse-
quently mandate a "match window" size which offers the most practical
assurance of correct matching.
6. Statistical inference. Probabilities are currently calculated by using
the product rule as applied to fixed bin analysis. 222 The probabilities of a
band appearing within areas on the film called bins are multiplied to-
gether to produce the statistical probability of a similar pattern occurring
by chance. The probabilities of a band occurrence within a bin are cal-
culated from a data base of prints. The data bases are divided according
to racial/ethnic classifications because likelihood of similar banding pat-
terns increases within discrete subgroups.
216 Williams, supra note 38, at 6-7.
217 Beeler & Wiebe, supra note 3, at 925.
218 Hoeffel, supra note 3, at 487-88.
219 Lifecodes' controls were characterized by Dr. Lander, "I came away appalled
at the lack of controls. With due respect, it's the sort of thing you don't let your
graduate students get away with." Parloff, supra note 35, at 53. Courts have
suggested controls. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Supp. 1989).
220 United States v. Yee, No. 3:89CR0720 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 1990); United
States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990).
221 The FBI acknowledges that "all but a small minority of casework matches
fall within a smaller range (85% within a 1.75% range). Magistrate's Report, Yee,
No. 3:89CR0720, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15908. Dr. Thomas Caskey adopted the
FBI protocol "almost in its entirety" in his lab, but he chose to use a smaller
match window. Id. at *122.
222 See generally Magistrate's Report, Yee, No. 3:89CR0720, 1990 U.S. Dist.




Fixed bin analysis offers more protection to the defendant than did
earlier analysis methods,2 3 but it is still widely contested as inherently
unreliable due to its reliance on the uncertain area of population ge-
netics. 224 Recent studies have supported use of the statistics but have also
pointed out the need for further research before concluding that such
statistics are valid and reliable.
22 5
7. Accreditation and certification. Standards for training and main-
tenance of proper lab conditions should be recommended. Forensic labs,
in general, are notoriously unregulated and have been known to assert
claims of scientific fact based on poorly performed tests. 226 Instituting
random checks on the labs will help to eliminate this problem. A system
for blind proficiency testing should be developed to monitor the accuracy
of the labs in order to maintain accreditation. Only one proficiency test
has been conducted on the private labs as of this date, 227 while the FBI
claims to perform internal proficiency testing.
2 28
The DTSB standards should be promulgated as example, not as statute.
In this way, they would be flexible enough to adapt to technological
changes without the pitfalls of legislative amendments. New methods
and materials could be proposed to the DTSB which would then coordinate
independent verification of the proposals, perhaps through colleges and
universities. If the procedures were found to be substantial improvements,
they could be implemented more quickly and consistently if documen-
tation were disseminated from only one agency. Since the procedures
would only be implemented after extensive testing, the changes should
be worthwhile investments. Presumably the innovations would not be
accepted in rapid succession due to the necessary verification process.
This would help to avoid continual retooling of the labs.
Information concerning DNA procedures should be available at a nom-
inal cost to all interested parties. Easier access to information will provide
increased awareness of the techniques to both the public (our resource of
future jurors) and to defense counsel.
223 The statistics presented in Yee were one in 35,000. Magistrate's Report, Yee,
No. 3:89CR0720, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15908; compare with cases cited supra
note 25.
224 See Magistrate's Report, United States v. Yee, No. 3:89CR0720, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15908.
225 B. Devlin, et al., No Excess of Homozygosity at Loci Used for DNA Finger-
printing, 249 SCIENCE, 1416 (1990).
228 Imwinkelried, supra note 23, at 555.
227 The proficiency test was conducted by the California Association of Crime
Laboratories. Fifty samples were analyzed by each of the three private labs.
Cellmark and Cetus each misidentified one sample. It it important to note that
while Lifecodes correctly identified all 50 samples, their researchers, not their
technicians, performed the tests. Hoeffel, supra note 3, at 493.
228 Hicks Statement, supra note 30.
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B. Conclusion
The creation of the DTSB would ultimately save the nation time and
money. The costly and time consuming burden of developing and updating
standards would be removed from the individual states. The DTSB stand-
ards would allow the individual state legislatures to direct their efforts
toward implementing a system of laboratory licensing contingent on ac-
creditation and proficiency test results.2 29 The legislature has the power
to control appropriations to the forensic labs and could stop appropriations
should a lab deviate from the national standards.
State statutes concerning licensing and accreditation are more appro-
priate to the legislative functions of regulation and appropriation than
are the current admissibility statutes. If states were to enact regulatory
statutes rather than admissibility statutes, they would be addressing the
primary concern about DNA technology - the lack of reliable standards.
The legislative and judicial branches of government should work in a
complementary fashion when faced with novel problems. Currently, the
admissibility statutes create an unnecessary tension between the very
bodies which must ultimately resolve the dilemmas presented by this new
technology.
DNA testing holds the promise of becoming an invaluable tool. Only
by a unified effort on the part of scientists, legislators and the legal
community can the current difficulties be resolved. Now is not the time
to divide and conquer; for those who will be conquered are the very ones
our system purports to protect.
JAYNE L. JAKUBAITIS
229 The FBI as a federal agency would not be regulated by state requirements.
Gary Spencer, Cuomo Urged to Pass on DNA Legislation, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1990,
at 1 (New York had difficulties with FBI regulation when it considered regulating
DNA laboratories). Congress should enforce the FBI's adherence to the DTSB
standards.
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